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The Market for Policy Communication 
Johan F.M. Swinnen, Thijs Vandemoortele & Mara Squicciarini 
1.  Introduction 
Development organizations, charities, aid agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and  other  institutions whose formal  objective is to enhance  welfare and  reduce suffering 
around the world are regularly accused of providing biased analyses on the state of the world 
and to have their actions guided by their private benefits – such as attracting media attention, 
raising funds, or personal fame – rather than the public goods they are supposed to be after. 
For example, on the 23
rd of January 2010, at the height of the humanitarian crisis in Haiti 
following the earthquake, The Lancet – an internationally renowned medical journal – in its 
editorial accused international aid agencies of adjusting their communication (and policies) to 
capture media attention and funding. The Lancet stressed how aid agencies disproportionately 
focus their attention on media-hyped humanitarian disasters (the Haiti cause in this case) 
rather than other equally serious cases: “It is scandalous that it took a seismic shift in tectonic 
plates for Haiti to earn its place in the international spotlight” (p.253). Around the same 
time,  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  was  being  accused  of 
exaggerating  the  negative  impacts  of  climate  change  and  of  biasing  communication  of 
research findings. 
An interesting ‘natural experiment’ on policy communication recently occurred with 
the 2007 ‘food crisis’, i.e. the hausse in global food prices from 2006 to mid 2008. Before the 
food crisis, the widely communicated policy perspective was that low food prices were a 
curse to developing countries and the poor. The dramatic increase of food prices in 2006-
2008 fundamentally altered communications on food policy. The vast majority of analyses 3 
 
and  reports  in  2008  and  2009  state  that  high  food  prices  have  a  devastating  effect  on 
developing countries and the world’s poor.  
The  dramatic  reversal  of  policy  communications  of  this  issue  is  illustrated  by  the 
following  quotes  from  global  NGOs  (Oxfam)  and  international  organizations  (United 
Nations), both before and after the food crisis:
1 
 
“US and Europe[‘s] surplus production is sold on world markets at artificially low 
prices, making it impossible for farmers in developing countries to compete. As a 




“Higher food prices have pushed millions of people in developing countries 
further into hunger and poverty. There are now 967 million 




“The long-term downward trend in agricultural commodity prices threatens the food 
security of hundreds of millions of people in some of the world's poorest developing 
countries.” 




“Rising food prices are bound to worsen the already unacceptable level of food 
deprivation suffered by 854 million people. We are facing the risk that the number of hungry 
will increase by many more millions of people.” 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (2008)
 5 
 
                                                 
1 See Swinnen (2010) for an elaborate and detailed documentation of this reversal of policy communication and 
argumentation  that  these  quotes  reflect  an  effective  and  dramatic  shift  in  policy  communications  by  these 
organizations. 
2  OXFAM  International,  International  celebrities  get  dumped  on  at  the  WSF,  1  November  2005. 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/node/283 
3  OXFAM  International,  Lessons  from  the  food  price  crisis:  Questions  &  Answers,  15  October  2008. 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/agriculture/food-price-crisis-questions-answers 
4 FAO newsroom, Agriculture commodity prices continue long-term decline, 15 February 2005, Rome/Geneva. 
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/EN/news/2005/89721/index.html 
5  FAO  Assistant  Director-General  Hafez  Ghane,  May  2008,  Rome. 
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/EN/news/2008/1000845/index.html 4 
 
This reversal, of course, raises questions about the correctness of these arguments and 
policies.  It  also  raises  questions  about  the  causes  of  this  dramatic  turnaround  in  the 
communication of policy conclusions.  
Bias in policy communication is an important issue. Policy communication by these 
organizations does influence policy thinking, government strategies, development priorities, 
and aid flows. For example, an important element of the current WTO negotiations (the so-
called  Doha  Development  Round)  is  to  reduce  the  depressing  effect  of  rich  countries’ 
agricultural policies on global food prices – a perspective which until the recent food crisis 
was widely seen as negative for developing countries. 
Some have explicitly linked the (bias in) policy communication of these organizations 
to capturing media attention and fundraising. For example, Cottle and Nolan (2007) argue 
that their humanitarian aim has become compromised as the focus of organizations is on their 
communication process: the ‘media logic’ of packaging information and images has become 
institutionalized inside aid agencies. The Lancet makes an even stronger statement: “Polluted 
by  the  internal  power  politics  and  the  unsavory  characteristics  seen  in  many  big 
corporations,  large  aid agencies  can  be  obsessed  with  raising  money through  their  own 
appeal efforts. Media coverage as an end in itself is too often an aim of their activities. 
Marketing and branding have too high a profile.”
6 
This issue has, so far, received little attention in the academic literature. There is a 
burgeoning literature on bias in communication in mass media
7 and its impact on government 
                                                 
6 The Lancet, Growth of Aid and the decline of humanitarianism, Volume 375, Issue 9711, 23 January 2010, p. 
253. 
7 Media bias can take various forms, and there is no generally accepted definition (McCluskey and Swinnen, 
2010). Anand et al (2007, p. 637) write that “[t]he phenomenon of bias in the media appears to be quite 
different than, say, a statistician’s notion of bias – because bias lies in the eyes of the beholder (consumer).” 
Others define bias as the “absence of balance resulting in one side of a story receiving unwarranted attention,” 
(Baron, 2006, p.4) or in other words, “… sins of omission – cases where a journalist chose facts or stories that 
only one side of the … spectrum is likely to mention” (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005, p.1205). In terms of political 
bias, Sutter (2001) defines media bias in terms of the media outlet’s position on the political spectrum relative to 5 
 
policy  (see.  e.g.  Jacobson,  2000;  Hawkins,  2002;  Strömberg,  2004;  Besley  and  Burgess, 
2001; Baron, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007). However, 
studies on international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, have focused 
almost exclusively on their lending and project implementation activities (see e.g. Aldenhoff, 
2007;  Dreher  et  al.,  2009;  Vaubel  et  al.,  2007).  There  are  a  series  of  recent  studies  on 
fundraising by NGOs and the impact of public and private funding on NGO activities and 
strategies (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Chau and Huysentruyt, 2006; Andreoni and Payne, 
2003;  Aldashev  and  Verdier,  2010).  For  example,  Aldashev  and  Verdier  (2010),  and 
Andreoni and Payne (2003) model the NGOs trade-off in allocating resources (time or funds) 
to fundraising. Allocation of resources to fundraising is needed to attract funds, but takes 
away  resources  from  project  implementation.  This  may  lead  to  inefficient  outcomes. 
However none of these studies addresses the nature of and possible bias in communication by 
these organizations. 
Our paper analyzes how communications to potential donors in fundraising affects the 
overall communication strategy of the organization, i.e. we analyze the nature of fundraising 
rather than its amount (in terms of either budget or time). Our model builds on the seminal 
work of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) on bias in mass media and of Andreoni and Payne 
(2003)  on  fundraising  by  charity  organizations.  We  model  how  ‘policy  organizations’ 
compete for donors’ funding. To receive more funding, they may introduce ‘bias’ into their 
policy communications by slanting the content of their reports. Bias in policy communication 
may draw in larger revenues through fundraising, but it may have negative welfare effects if 
it induces suboptimal behavior by various other agents who use this advice for their decision-
making. 
                                                                                                                                                     
the views of the median voter. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006, p.3) develop a “slant” index, which measures 
“differences in news content that … would tend to increase a reader’s support for one side of the political 
spectrum”. 6 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a conceptual framework 
and a set of working definitions. In the third section we develop a formal model to analyze 
the  equilibrium  slanting  behavior  of  competing  policy  organizations  and  derive  a  set  of 
hypotheses on policy communication in the case of homogenous donors’ beliefs. The fourth 
section extends the model to the case of heterogeneous donors’ beliefs and the fifth section 
includes ‘problem severity’ in the donors’ utility. The sixth and the seventh sections analyze 
the equilibrium slanting behavior when donors’ beliefs are endogenous and influenced by 
respectively policy communication and mass media. The last section concludes. 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
To explain possible bias in ‘policy communication’, we focus on the interaction between 
‘policy organizations’ and ‘donors’. We define ‘policy communication’ as communication of 
advice  and  results  of  analyses  of  important  public  policy  issues.  It  includes  rapid 
communications (such as interviews or press releases) and more extensive externally-released 
extensive reports on certain issues. It does not include news or reports from commercial 
media sources or internal reports of organizations.  
We use the term ‘policy organizations’ (POs) to represent all organizations who are 
communicating public policy analyses and advice and who obtain a significant share of their 
funding from various external sources (‘donors’). POs can include organizations as diverse as 
international  NGOs  (such  as  Oxfam,  Greenpeace,  Médecins  sans  Frontières,  …), 
intergovernmental  organizations  (such  as  the  World  Bank,  United  Nations  organizations 
(such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), UNICEF, etc.), …) and a variety of 
national NGOs and organizations. In our model, POs do not include commercial companies 
or organizations representing specific interest groups with single source funding (such as 
labor unions or associations of companies).  7 
 
POs engage in both analysis and communication. The purposes of the POs’ analysis 
(i.e. fact finding and various types of research) are multiple: their analysis serves to support 
internal decision-making on funding and project implementation. Analysis also provides the 
basis for policy communication. The POs’ communication strategy has two objectives. The 
first objective is policy advice, i.e. to influence others (e.g. governments) to implement or 
reform  certain  policies.  The  second  objective  is  fundraising,  i.e.  to  influence  donors  to 
contribute  funds  to  the  POs.  Policy  communication  by  the  POs  is  influenced  by  both 
objectives and by the agents they interact with (donors and those targeted with advice).  
POs receive a significant share of their funding from a variety of ‘donors’. Donors may 
include  public  entities  (such  as  governments)  or  private  entities  (such  as  foundations  or 
households). POs are not guaranteed external funding but have to raise funds by convincing 
potential donors that it is worthwhile to contribute funds to their activities. POs need to invest 
in  fundraising  activities in an environment  where various POs compete for attention and 
funding of donors. This assumption is consistent with the observation that all international 
organizations  use  to  some  extent  funds  from  public  or  private  donors  to  operate  and 
implement  their  projects,  or  that  subgroups  within  large  organizations  have  to  compete 
internally for funding.
  
For  some  of  the  POs,  such  as  many  NGOs,  fundraising  means  actually  writing  to 
potential donors or going door-to-door to raise funds. Here communication and fundraising 
are  used  directly  to  influence  donors  (e.g.  Andreoni  and  Payne,  2003;  Rose-Ackerman, 
1982). Other POs may have a more structural source of external funding (such as some of the 
intergovernmental organizations). While their funding sources may differ, in a world where 
financial means are limited and where there is continuous pressure to demonstrate relevance 
and importance of budget spending on particular items, or on projects or divisions within 
large organizations, all these organizations face a demand to demonstrate the importance and 8 
 
relevance of their projects and activities. Policy communication is part of such strategy to 
show relevance and importance – and may thus help in securing and raising funds.
8  
3.  The Model  
The variable   represents the true state of the economy, e.g. the impact of an earthquake, 
global warming, or rising food prices. We normalize the true state of the economy to zero 
(     ). Donors, indexed by  , hold certain beliefs    about this situation  , and these beliefs 
may be biased. If        donor   has an optimistic belief about the state of the economy, 
whereas if        the donor holds a pessimistic belief. To start, we assume that these beliefs 
are  exogenous;  later  we  relax  this  assumption  and  allow  for  beliefs  to  be  endogenously 
determined. 
Two POs, indexed by          , collect (the same) data on the state of the economy 
 . We assume that POs perform correct analyses, i.e. they gather the necessary information 
and use appropriate methodologies to arrive at the correct conclusion   about the state of the 
economy        . The POs communicate their conclusions to the external world by means of 
‘reports’, containing information   . We assume POs may introduce an amount of slanting    
in their policy communications, so their reports contain information            .  
3.1  Donors 
We follow Andreoni and Payne (2003)’s key assumptions on donor behavior. Donors have a 
latent demand to donate. Unless asked, this demand goes unexpressed. This implies that a 
                                                 
8  A  related argument is  that  the  donors  may  expect  (or  even  demand)  that these  organizations  focus  their 
attention on and communicate policy options for issues and problems which the donors consider important. If 
they would not publicly react (‘communicate’) on these problems, it would hurt their “legitimacy” as policy 
organizations. This could undermine overall support for their existence.The following quote from a regional 
AICF coordinator (Action Internatonial contre la Faim) illustrates this: “An NGO simply must be in certain 
areas that the donors are paying attention to. If they are not, there is the sense that they are doing something 
wrong, that perhaps their projects are after all really not so worthwhile” (Rieff, 1995, p5). 9 
 
donor does not give money to a PO unless solicited. Donors support at most one PO and the 
amount  to  donate,     ,  is  set  by  the  PO.  We  extend  this  framework  by  assuming  that 
solicitation  of  donors’  support  by  POs  occurs  through  the  POs’  reports.  A  donor  selects 
which  PO  to  support  based  on  a  comparison  of  the  POs’  reports’  contents      and  their 
requested donations    .  
In line with Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005), we assume that on the one hand donors 
dislike slanted reports because it is costly both in effort and time to read a slanted report and 
‘to figure out the truth’. On the other hand, donors get disutility from reading reports that are 
inconsistent with their beliefs. Formally, a donor  ’s utility of reading the report of PO   and 
consequently donating to PO   is: 





         
              
 
                                    
                    
                               
   (1)
where    is the ‘warm glow’ a donor receives from donating (see Andreoni and Payne, 
2003). If a donor does not read any report, and consequently does not donate, he receives 
zero utility. The constant       is a measure for a donor’s sensitivity to slanting; therefore 
   
  represents the disutility from reading a slanted report issued by PO  .       represents a 
donor’s  preference  for  reading  a  report  consistent  with  his  beliefs,  where  consistency  is 
modeled  as  the  distance  between  the  report’s  content      and  the  donor’s  beliefs    ,  i.e. 
         
 
.  
3.2  Policy Organizations 
As discussed before, the POs’ policy communication has two objectives. On the one hand, 
POs’  reports serve  the  purpose  of fundraising; on  the  other  hand they  aim at improving 10 
 
government  policy through their reports. The PO chooses  its slanting strategy    and  the 
donation     it requests to maximize its objective function         , which is the weighted sum 
of revenues,        and policy impact,        . The objective function of PO   is 
                                    (2) 
where    and    are the respective weights of revenues and policy impact. The revenues 
       are the funds collected from donors who decide to donate to PO   after reading its 
report. The policy impact,         is specified as                        , with       being the 
policy  impact  of  a  report  that  is  not  slanted.  We  abstract  from  the  complexities  of  the 
decision-making  process  of  governments  and  assume  they  choose  better  policies  when 
receiving  better  (i.e.  less  slanted)  information  from  the  reports.  The  policy  impact  is 
decreasing in the distance between the report’s contents    and the true situation  .  
  The sequence of the game is the same as in Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005). First, the 
POs  simultaneously  announce  their  slanting  strategies    .  Second,  they  simultaneously 
announce their requested donations    , after the POs have revealed their slanting strategy. 
Third, donors decide whether and to which PO to donate, based on the utilities associated 
with the respective strategies    and requested donations    . Fourth, POs finish their analyses 
of the state of the world, i.e. they find  , and report information            . Fifth, if donors 
support a PO, they read the report and receive utility. 
3.3 Equilibrium with Homogeneous Biased Donors 
In this section we discuss the POs’ optimal slanting strategy when all donors hold the same 
beliefs, i.e.        for all  i, where    may  be different from  . The number of donors is 
normalized to one. The POs’ equilibrium slanting strategy when donors have homogenous 
beliefs,       
  , is summarized by the following proposition: 11 
 
 
Proposition 1: If donors have homogenous beliefs, the equilibrium slanting strategy of both 
POs         is: 
          
   
   
              
    (3) 
If donors’ beliefs are unbiased, POs do not slant the information in their reports:       
      
for      . If beliefs are biased, POs slant the content of their reports in the direction of 
donors’ beliefs:       
      for       and       
      for      . 
 
Proof:  
See Appendix for all proofs. 
 
Proposition 1 holds the important result that, if donors’ beliefs are biased, POs slant the 
information in their reports to be more consistent with donors’ beliefs and thus to attract more 
donations. Because donors’ beliefs are homogenous, POs select the same equilibrium slanting 
strategy, i.e.       
          
  . Consider the case that, for whatever reason, donors perceive 
the world to be worse than it actually is        . If this is the case, our model shows that POs 
slant their reports such that   
     , and hence report the situation to be more negative (or less 
positive) than the actual state    
              . 
From  Proposition  1  it  is  possible  to  formally  derive  the  impact  of  several  factors 
(besides donors’ beliefs), on the extent of slant in the POs’ policy communications. First, if 
the  weight  attached  to  revenues  in  the  POs’  objective  function  increases,  the  amount  of 
slanting increases  
        
   
   
    , while if the weight attached to policy impact increases, the 12 
 
amount of slanting decreases  
        
   
   
     9. This illustrates the trade-off between the two 
objectives of the POs and the conflicting impact of slanting on the POs’ different objectives. 
When POs’ reports are more consistent with biased donors’ beliefs and thus more slanted, 
POs  attract  more  donations.  Hence  when  the  revenue  objective  is  more  important  (   
relatively higher), POs add more slant to their policy communications. However, reports that 
are  slanted  more  cause  more  negative  impact  on  policy,  which  reduces  the  POs’  policy 
impact objective. Therefore if the latter objective is relatively more important (   relatively 
higher), POs slant their policy communication less.
10 
  Second, changes in the donors’ utility function’s parameters affect the equilibrium 
slanting by POs as well. If donors are more sensitive to slanting, the amount of slanting 
decreases  
        
   
       . For higher  , POs have less incentives to publish slanted reports 
since  slanting  has  a  larger  negative  effect  on donors’  willingness  to  donate  and  thus  on 
revenues.  
Third,  if  donors  have  higher  preferences  for  reading  reports  consistent  with  their 
beliefs, the amount  of slanting  increases  
        
   
         because  POs  then  have  a  higher 
incentive to slant their policy communication in order to attract more revenues. 
In  the  next  sections,  we  extend  the  model  in  three  directions.  First,  we  introduce 
heterogeneity in donors’ beliefs and derive the POs’ equilibrium slanting strategy. Second, 
we  examine  how  the  POs’  slanting  strategy  is  affected  when  the  donors’  willingness  to 
                                                 
9 The absolute value of       
   reflects the fact that the impact of these factors is symmetric for       
      and 
for       
     . Notice also that these factors have no impact when       
     . 
10 One could make this trade-off more explicit by assuming that             where   is a constant. This would 
make the trade-off even stronger since a change in one of the weights would simultaneously imply an opposing 
change in the other weight. The effect of a change in one weight would hence be reinforced by the effect of the 
subsequent change in the other weight.  13 
 
donate  is  affected  by  the  nature  of  the  policy  and  by  economic  conditions.  Finally,  we 
analyze the impact of endogenous beliefs on POs’ slanting strategies, both when beliefs are 
influenced by policy communication and by mass media.  
4.  Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Donors 
In the previous section we assumed that all donors hold the same beliefs. In reality donors 
may vary in their beliefs and may disagree on the interpretation of a situation or on how a PO 
should handle it. Such heterogeneity could come from ideological differences or from being 
based on different information sources. 
  To formally model this heterogeneity, we assume that donors’ beliefs are uniformly 
distributed between    and    where        .     denotes the average of    and   . The 
number of donors is normalized to one. In line with Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), we 
make  the  following  two  simplifying  assumptions.  First,  we  only  consider  linear  slanting 
strategies of the form     
   
          
  , where    is the point around which PO   slants. 
This linear strategy is based on a PO’s optimal slanting strategy when donor beliefs are 
homogenous (see Equation (3)).
11 Second, we assume that        , i.e. that the beliefs of the 
average donor are unbiased. Since    is uniformly distributed and        , this implies that 
        .  
Proposition 2 summarizes the optimal donation        
   and POs’ slanting behavior       
   
when donors have heterogeneous beliefs.  
 
                                                 
11 As Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005) prove, this linear strategy is always optimal for a monopolist PO when 
donor beliefs are heterogeneous. 14 
 
Proposition 2: If POs face a donor landscape with heterogeneous beliefs and choose linear 
strategies of the form     
   
          
  , and        , there exists a constant  
     
                  
        9
         
      
              
 
  
such that if       , POs choose
12: 
          
   
   




      (4) 
   
      
   
   




      
(5) 
   
       
   
     
              
  
    
(6) 
 
Proposition 2 implies both POs slant their reports but no longer in the same direction as 
with homogeneous donors. PO   reports the situation to be more negative than it is in reality 
whereas PO   reports the situation to be more positive. Importantly, unlike in the case of 
homogenous donors, even when donors’ beliefs are unbiased on average          , both POs 
always slant their reports when donors’ beliefs are heterogeneously distributed:       
       
          
  ; and with         ,       
            
  .  
The  size  of  the  slanting  depends  on  the  same  factors  as  discussed  in  the  previous 
section. When choosing how to slant, POs maximally differentiate themselves to increase 
donations.  
Proposition 2 implies that POs position the content of their reports as far away from 
each other as the donors’ sensitivity to slanting and the POs’ policy impact objective permit, 
                                                 
12 Without loss of generality, we assume that PO   introduces a negative slant and PO   a positive slant. 
 15 
 
in order to attract as many donations as possible. An important implication is that when 
donors’ sensitivity to slanting is sufficiently low, POs may slant their policy communications 
such that their reports are even more extreme than the most extreme beliefs of donors in the 
population. From equations (4) and (5), it follows that for                     ,       
       
and        
      .  As            is  the  most  pessimistic  (optimistic)  belief  in  the  donor 
population, PO  ’s (PO  ’s) report       
          
    is more negative (positive) than the most 
pessimistic  (optimistic)  belief.  Extreme  slanting  is  more  likely  when  donors’  slanting 
sensitivity is sufficiently low,    sufficiently high and    sufficiently low. 
5.  Problem Severity 
So  far  we  have  assumed  that  donors’  direct  utility  of  donating,  the  ‘warm  glow’    ,  is 
independent from the severity of the problems on which POs report and solicit donations for. 
This implicitly assumes that donors draw the same ‘warm glow’ from, for example, helping 
the victims of a local flood that made a few rich people having to leave their house for a few 
days and an earthquake that killed thousands of people and made millions of poor homeless. 
As this example illustrates, it is not unconceivable that donors draw more utility if their 
donations have larger welfare impacts. We therefore extend our model with homogenous 
donor  beliefs  to  account  for  ‘problem  severity’  in  the  donors’  ‘warm  glow’  utility  of 
donating.  
POs’ inform donors about the severity of the problems for which they solicit donations 
through  their  reports’  contents             .  Formally,  we  assume  that  the  warm  glow 
component in the donors’ utility function equals            
       , where   is a scalar 
which measures the donors’ warm glow from supporting a PO that addresses more severe 
problems. For example, if PO   reports that it deals with a more negative situation (       16 
 
and larger in absolute value), utility from donating to this PO is higher.
13 The POs’ optimal 
slanting  behavior  when  donors  care  about  ‘problem  severity’  and  their  beliefs  are 
homogenous,     
  ,is summarized in Proposition 3. To focus specifically on the impact of the 
extensions in the next sections, we consider homogenous donors. 
 
Proposition  3:  If  donors  care  about  contributing  to  solving  more  severe  problems,  the 
equilibrium slanting strategy of PO j, with        , is:  
        
   
  
              
     
 
 
    (7) 
and POs depict situations as being more negative:     
          
   
   
Comparing the optimal slanting strategies in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 indicates that, 
when donors derive more utility from contributing to more severe situations, POs tend to 
make the content of their policy communications more negative (or less positive). Even if 
homogenous donors’ beliefs are unbiased or slightly positive               , POs report 
the situation as negative      
        
      . This effect is stronger if the marginal impact of 
problem severity on donor utility is larger  
     
 
       . 
6.  Endogenous Beliefs  
So far, we have assumed that donors’ beliefs are exogenously determined. However, it is 
more realistic to consider that donors’ beliefs are not static. People may change their opinion 
on a certain issue, for example, because they receive additional information that is not in line 
with  their  beliefs.  Such  new  information  may  come  from  the  POs’  communication 
                                                 
13 For simplicity, we have assumed a linear impact of problem severity on utility, but any function that is 
increasing in     would have the same effect. 17 
 
themselves, or from other sources, such as the mass media. We first consider the impact of 
POs’ communication and then of mass media on beliefs. 
6.1 Beliefs Influenced by Policy Communication 
The POs’ communication may influence donors’ beliefs if the report differs from the donors’ 
beliefs.  Such changes  in  donors’  beliefs  will, in  turn,  induce changes  in  the equilibrium 
slanting. In this section we therefore analyze the dynamic effects of slanting when donors’ 
beliefs  are  endogenous,  i.e.  when  donors  update  their  previous  periods’  beliefs  with  the 
content of the POs’ policy communications. We extend the model of the previous section, i.e. 
we assume a  donor population with homogenous  beliefs where  donors draw utility from 
donating to more severe problems.  
Consider a simple updating rule where donors’ beliefs of the current period are the 
average of their previous period’s beliefs and the PO’s report’s content. Formally, we assume 
      
       
  , with             indicating the time period,    the exogenous initial belief, 
and    the donors’ belief in period  . Suppose the actual situation does not change over time 
                     . The long run equilibrium belief and slanting can then be derived. 
 
Proposition 4: When donors prefer contributing to more severe problems and update their 
beliefs based on POs’ reports,       
        
  , in the long run donor beliefs and slanting 
converge to a biased equilibrium:  
       
  ∞
        
  ∞
    
   
  
   
           
      (8) 
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Equation  (8)  implies  that  beliefs  converge  to  a  finite  and  negative  value  after  a 
sufficiently long time period, given that all other factors remain constant. Because POs slant 
their  reports  in  a  negative  direction  to  attract  more  support  from  donors  that  prefer 
contributing to more severe problems, donors’ beliefs converge to some negative value. In 
the long run, the equilibrium slanting by POs converges to the same value as the long run 
beliefs, i.e.            
            . 
  A very important implication of Proposition 4 is that the initial exogenous beliefs    
do  not  matter  in  the  long  run.  The  impact  of      decreases  over  time  and  eventually 
disappears. This also implies that even if initial beliefs are correct         , beliefs become 
biased over time and converge to some negative value, due to the fact that unbiased beliefs 
are updated with slanted reports. 
The result in Proposition 4 depends on the assumption that donors prefer to contribute 
to more serious problems. Because POs are aware of this preference, they depict situations as 
more problematic than they are to draw in more donations, which in turn alters the beliefs of 
donors.  From  Equation  (8)  it  follows  that  if  donors  do  not  value  giving  to  more  severe 
situations         ,  beliefs  converge  to  the  actual  situation                and  slanting 
disappears as well. 
6.2 Beliefs Influenced by Mass Media 
We now analyze how slanting by POs is influenced when donors update their beliefs with 
information provided by other sources. We focus on mass media.
14  
                                                 
14 In general, there are two important, but distinct, mechanisms at work in the interaction between POs and the 
mass media. The first mechanism is the desire of POs to appear in the mass media in order to raise funds and 
strengthen their legitimacy. The second mechanism is the impact of stories that appear in the mass media on the 
policy communications of POs through their impact on donors’ beliefs. Mass media may play an important role 
in shaping donors’ beliefs about situations in the world. In this paper we focus only on the second mechanism. 
A  rapidly  growing  literature documents  other  effects  of  mass  media  on  development  such as  its  effect  on 19 
 
Media attention is typically concentrated around ‘events’ or ‘shocks’ (Swinnen and 
Francken,  2006).
15  Mass  media’s  impact  on  donors’  beliefs  is  determined  by  its  broad 
audience and the relative speed of mass media coverage. Typically mass media can bring 
news reports much faster than a report from a PO that may require substantially more time for 
a thorough analysis of the situation and corresponding policy communications.  
To analyze this, define   as the content of the mass media’s reports. Given the fact that 
mass media are faster at covering sudden events, we assume that mass media reports have a 
strong  influence  on  shaping  donors’  initial  beliefs.  To  simplify  the  analysis,  we  further 
assume (a) that donors have no prior beliefs on the issue before the media reports, (b) that 
they discount media  reporting, expecting a certain exaggeration, and (c) that media only 
influence  initial  beliefs.  In  this case,           where         is  a  ‘discount factor’,  and 
        for       .  For       ,  donors  update  their  beliefs  with  the  POs’  reports’  content 
according to       
       
   as in the previous section. Proposition 5 summarizes the POs 
optimal slanting behaviour in the short run         and in the long run. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
political  accountability  (e.g.  Besley  and  Burgess,  2001;  Djankov  et  al.,  2003)  and  its  impact  on  reducing 
corruption in public policy (Francken et al., 2008; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).  
15 For example, Swinnen and Francken (2006) find that virtually all the attention to globalization, trade and 
development issues in mass media is concentrated around ‘international summits’.  20 
 
Proposition 5: If donors care about contributing to solving more severe problems, if mass 
media reports shape donors’ initial beliefs           , and if donors update their beliefs 
based  on  POs’  reports         
       
   ,  the  equilibrium  slanting  strategy  of  PO   ,  with 
       , at       is:   
          
   
  
              
                  (9) 
In the long run donor beliefs and slanting converge to a biased equilibrium:  
       
  ∞
        
  ∞
    
   
  
   
           
      (10) 
 
Equation  (9)  implies  that  mass  media  reports  influence  the  POs’  initial  policy 
communications since 
       
 
    
     
          
   . This simple comparative statics result shows 
that POs slant their reports in the same direction as media attention. As a consequence, the 
generally recognized tendency of the mass media to focus on the negative aspects of a story 
        induces POs to slant their reports negatively, i.e.       
     . However, in the long 
run the effect of the media reports on slanting disappears (Equation (10)). Thus, in the long 
run when mass media no longer report on the situation, the mass media’s effect on slanting 
fades out. Hence, negative mass media reports on a situation initially induce POs to slant 
their reports’ contents negatively, but in the long run this impact wanes.
16 
                                                 
16 This argument is related to the agenda setting effect of the media in international and aid policy, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘CNN factor’ (Hawkins, 2002). It refers to the process by which the media influences policy 
by invoking responses in their audiences through concentrated and emotionally based coverage, which in turn 
applies pressure to governments to react (potentially through POs). Similarly, the absence of media coverage 
reduces priority in agenda-setting (Jakobson, 2000). In this logic, public officials react to media news because 
they see it as a reflection of public opinion (Kim, 2005). Some have questioned the importance of these effects 
(Natsios, 1996) and argue that the media is more likely to follow politics than lead it (Strobel, 1996). A more 
nuanced argument is forwarded by Robinson (2001) who explains that the media can be a powerful source in 
leading policy makers but primarily when there is great uncertainty or limited information. This is consistent 
with our argument that media is more likely to influence initial beliefs. Several studies have analyzed the impact 
of media coverage of poverty, humanitarian crises, and natural disasters on humanitarian and foreign aid flows. 
Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004) and Kim (2005) find that a higher level of media attention to developing 21 
 
6.3 Media and POs: Discussion 
This  causal  relationship  of  mass  media  affecting  donors’  beliefs  and  consequently 
influencing POs’ policy communications depends on the nature of the problem/policy. For 
longer  term  or  structural  problems,  mass  media  may  not  play  a  role  in  affecting  initial 
conditions. On such issues, it may rather be that the mass media report on an issue because of 
a PO’s report. In this case, the donors’ initial beliefs would not be affected by the mass 
media, and neither would the POs’ initial policy communications. If beliefs in future periods 
are then updated with the PO’s report’s content through the media who report on it, the effect 
would be as summarized in Proposition 4. Formally, for structural problems,           and 
hence the beliefs updating rule       
     
   is the same as in the previous section and the 
results of Proposition 4 apply. 
7.  Conclusion 
NGOs and intergovernmental organizations are accused of providing biased and incorrect 
policy analyses in pursuit of their private interest. To analyze this issue formally, we have 
modeled competition by ‘policy organizations’ for donors funding. To receive more funding, 
policy organizations may introduce ‘bias’ into their policy communications by slanting the 
content of their reports. Bias in policy communications may draw in larger revenues through 
fundraising, but it may have negative effects as policy advice is also biased.  
Our analysis shows that policy organizations do not slant their reports only under very 
restrictive, and unrealistic, conditions. Only when (1) donors’ beliefs are homogenous; (2) 
donors’ beliefs are unbiased; and (3) donors’ utility is not affected by the severity of the 
problem, policy organizations do not slant their reports. However, in all other cases POs will 
                                                                                                                                                     
countries problems leads to more aid in several developed countries. Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) argue that 
disaster relief decisions and aid allocations are driven by media coverage of disasters but that other newsworthy 
events may crowd out this news coverage. 22 
 
slant their communications.  
First,  if  donors’  beliefs  are  biased,  policy  organizations  slant  their  policy 
communication in the direction of the donors’ beliefs. The level of the optimal slanting is 
affected by several factors, such as the relative importance of respectively fundraising and 
policy impact in the policy organizations’ objective function, and the donors’ sensitivity to 
slanting and to reading reports that are inconsistent with their beliefs. 
Second,  with  heterogeneity  in  donors’  beliefs,  policy  organizations  differentiate 
themselves  in  the  policy  communication  market.  They  slant  their  reports  in  different 
directions to increase donations from a subgroup of the population. When donors’ slanting 
sensitivity is sufficiently low, the policy organizations’ reports are even more extreme than 
the most extreme donors’ beliefs in the population. 
Third, when accounting for problem severity, i.e. when donors prefer donating to policy 
organizations that (claim to) address more severe problems, our model showed that policy 
organizations depict situations as being more negative than they actually are, even when 
donors’ beliefs are unbiased. 
Fourth, when donors’ beliefs are endogenous this affects slanting. When donors update 
their beliefs with the policy communications of the organizations, both donors’ beliefs and 
the policy organizations’ slanting converge to a biased equilibrium. An important finding is 
that the initial beliefs do not matter, and that even if these initial beliefs were correct they 
become biased over time.  
Mass media may play an important role in influencing donors’ beliefs, in particular 
initial beliefs. When initial beliefs are influenced by mass media reports, these mass media 
reports induce POs to slant their reports. In the long run this impact disappears if donors 
update their beliefs with information from other sources. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We solve the game by backward induction. We first determine the optimal donation    
  and 
then proceed to find the optimal slanting strategy   
 .  
Consider  the  donation-setting  stage.  Let       be  a  donor   ’s  utility,  gross  of  the 
requested donation, from donating to PO   and reading its report                  . Suppose 
that          , with            . The price equilibrium for PO   is to request a donation 
equal to                 to capture the full market for donations.  
In the slanting strategy-setting stage, PO   optimizes its objective function          by 
setting its slanting strategy   , holding constant the other PO’s strategy, i.e.  
     
  
                                    (A.1) 
Because the number of donors is normalized to one, optimizing    is equivalent to optimizing 
   . Therefore PO  ’s objective function is increasing in the donors’ utility from donating to 
PO  , since                 and     (the utility from donating to the other PO) is constant. 
Consequently it is an optimal strategy for each PO to maximize donor utility. The first order 
condition from Equation (A.1) is then 
                                       (A.2) 
Since          is concave in   , this first order condition determines a global maximum and 
the equilibrium slanting strategy of both POs is 
 
      
   
   
              
   
(A.3) 24 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The proof of Proposition 2 resembles the proof of a Hotelling model where firms compete on 
prices  after  choosing  their  location,  and  transportation  costs  are  quadratic  (see  also 
Mullainathan & Schleifer, 2005). We consider only the situation where the POs choose linear 
slanting strategies. Define 
      
  
              
    (A.4) 
to be the strategy of PO   that slants around point   . 
We proceed with backward induction. 
i.  We calculate                , i.e. the bias of the donor who is indifferent between 
donating to the two POs if PO   charges     and slants around point    (chosen in the 
first stage of the game and taken as given in this stage). 
ii.  We then calculate   
            and   
           , the best response functions for 
PO   and   respectively. 
iii.  Using these response functions, we calculate the equilibrium donations   
         and 
  
         and market share           that result from the choice of slant in the first 
stage. 
iv.  We then use these equilibrium donations to show that in the first stage, at     
 
    
and     
 
       
 
   , the POs are indifferent between lowering and raising   , and 
thus in equilibrium. 




i. The utility that a donor with bias   receives from donating     to PO   that slants around    
is: 
          
             
 
        (A.5) 
Inserting the definition of    and rearranging produces 
 
      
   




              
        
  
              
       
(A.6) 
If the donor with bias   is indifferent between these two POs, then the utilities from donating 
to the two POs are equal:  
 
      
   




              
        
  
              
    
        
   




              
        
  
              
      
(A.7) 
This can be simplified to 
 
                
              
       
  
  
   
         
              
    
(A.8) 
with             ,             ,                    . 
 
ii. Since the indifferent donor is located at  , the POs’ objective functions are given by 
 
                       
      
       
           
   








                      
      
       
           
   




    
(A.10) 
PO  ’s best response function can be derived by differentiating its objective function with 
respect to its own donation    . For PO  , this first-order condition is 
      
   
 
  
       
            
  
   
       
(A.11) 
Using that         , the best response function of PO   is 
 
  




      
              
     
         
              
     
(A.12) 
Similarly, the best response function of PO   is 
 
  




      
              
     
         
              
     
(A.13) 
 
iii. The equilibrium donations can be calculated from the best response functions by solving 
    
      
    
    
            (A.14) 
    
      
    
    
            (A.15) 
Calculating these equations result in respectively 
 
  
          
      
              
      
 
 
         
              




          
      
              
      
 
 
         
              
     
(A.17) 
Using these equilibrium donations, the equilibrium market share is 
 
           
         







iv. These equilibrium donations and market share allow to examine the POs’ decisions in the 
first stage. Specifically, taking the other PO’s slanting as given, they can be used to calculate 
each PO’s objective function for each chosen slant: 
 
                 
        
                
       
           
   




    
(A.19) 
 
                
        
                
       
           
   




    
(A.20) 
Differentiation of PO  ’s objective function with respect to    gives 
      
   
 
  
       
   
 
   
     
         






       
         




       
   
              
 
 
    
(A.21) 
Supposing that we are in a symmetric case where          so that        and          , 
putting this first derivative equal to zero results in 
 
 
      
              
          
 
 
         
              
 
 
   
              
       
(A.22) 
Rewriting  shows  that  in  equilibrium  of  the  first  stage,    
     
 
     
 
     and  a  similar 
derivation  leads  to    
   
 
   .  For  these  choices  of    
 ,  donations  equal 
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(A.24) 
 
v. We must verify that in equilibrium the participation constraints of the donors are satisfied. 
It suffices to show that the donor located at zero receives non-zero utility from donating to 
either PO, i.e. 
 
             
   





      
    
              
   
       
(A.25) 
which is equivalent to 
 
      
                  
    ²   9
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which is what was assumed in the statement of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The  extended  ‘warm  glow’  component,             
       ,  modifies  the  donors’  utility 
function to: 
          
             
             
 
        (A.27) 
The POs’ equilibrium slanting strategy is determined through the same backward induction as 
described  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  1.  Again  maximizing  donor  utility,  the  first  order 
condition of the PO’s maximization problem is  
                                             (A.28) 
Collecting terms produces 29 
 
      
   
  
              
     
 
 
    (A.29) 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
From Proposition 3, we know that 
 
    
   
                
              
  
(A.30) 
To simplify the notation, we define    
   
          
 and    
        
          
, hence     
       
   .  Inserting  this  expression  in  the  updating  rule,        
       
  ,  we  have  that        
         
    After   periods, donors’ beliefs are equal to 
        








     
 
 
     
   
   (A.31) 
Since we are interested in the long run equilibrium beliefs and slanting, we need to verify 
whether Equation (A.31) converges to a finite number for   going to infinity, and if so, to 
which value. A necessary condition for convergence is that  
   
       , such that the first term 
of the right hand side of Equation (A.31) converges to  . Using the definition of  , we find 
that  
     
     
 
     
 
 
        
              
      (A.32) 
Hence     
  ∞
 
   
   
 
      .  Taking  the  limit  of  the  second  term  on  the  right  hand  side  of 
Equation (A.31) for   going to infinity, given that  
   
       , we find that  
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Using the definitions of   and  , the long run donors’ beliefs thus converge to a negative 
value: 
     
  ∞
    
      
           
      (A.34) 
Inserting the expression for      ∞   from (A.34) into Equation (A.30), we find that  
     
  ∞
      
      
           
      (A.35) 
and hence  
     
  ∞
        
  ∞
       (A.36) 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
From Proposition 3 we know that 
      
   
                
              
   (A.37) 
Thus, at      , the equilibrium slanting strategy of both POs         is  
        
   
  
              
                  (A.38) 
Since         . 
In the long run, donors update their beliefs according to the updating rule       
       
  . 
Since Proposition 4 demonstrated that in this case the initial beliefs do not matter in the long 
run,  and  hence  the  media  reports  do  not  matter  in  the  long  run,  the  same  result  as  in 
Proposition  4  holds  for      ∞.  Donors’  beliefs  and  slanting  converge  to  the  biased 
equilibrium:  
     
  ∞
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      (A.39) 
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